Individual and Group Behavior in the Ultimatum Game: Are Groups More “Rational” Players?

Gary Bornstein and Ilan Yaniv

Experimental Economics, 1998, vol. 1, issue 1, 108 pages

Abstract: This article reports two experiments that compared the standard ultimatum game played by individuals with the same game played by three-person groups. In the group treatment, the members of the allocating group conducted a brief, face-to-face discussion in order to decide, as a group, on a proposed division, whereas the members of recipient group held a discussion on whether to accept or reject the proposal. If the proposal was accepted, each group member received an equal share of his group's payoff (the pie in the group condition was three times that in the individual condition). In both experiments, groups offered less than individuals. But as indicated by the low rejection rate in both treatments, groups were also willing to accept less. Copyright Economic Science Association 1998

Keywords: ultimatum game; group decision (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (226)

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DOI: 10.1023/A:1009914001822

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