Bargaining and Dilemma Games: From Laboratory Data Towards Theoretical Synthesis

Gary Bolton ()

Experimental Economics, 1998, vol. 1, issue 3, 257-281

Abstract: Bargaining and dilemma games have developed in experimental economics as fairly separate literatures. More than a few analysts are now persuaded that the patterns of behavior in these games are closely related, and considerable effort is being put into a search for models that bridge the gap between the two types of games. I focus on a handful of models that, when taken together, outline the conceptual issues, and provide a sense of the progress that has already been made. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1998

Keywords: bargaining; dilemma games; bounded rationality; learning; motivation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1023/A:1009911411418 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:expeco:v:1:y:1998:i:3:p:257-281

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ry/journal/10683/PS2

DOI: 10.1023/A:1009911411418

Access Statistics for this article

Experimental Economics is currently edited by David J. Cooper, Lata Gangadharan and Charles N. Noussair

More articles in Experimental Economics from Springer, Economic Science Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().