Transparency and cooperation in repeated dilemma games: a meta study

Lenka Fiala and Sigrid Suetens

Experimental Economics, 2017, vol. 20, issue 4, No 1, 755-771

Abstract: Abstract We use data from experiments on finitely repeated dilemma games with fixed matching to investigate the effect of different types of information on cooperation. The data come from 71 studies using the voluntary contributions paradigm, covering 122 data points, and from 18 studies on decision-making in oligopoly, covering another 50 data points. We find similar effects in the two sets of experimental games. We find that transparency about what everyone in a group earns reduces contributions to the public good, as well as the degree of collusion in oligopoly markets. In contrast, transparency about choices tends to lead to an increase in contributions and collusion, although the size of this effect varies somewhat between the two settings. Our results are potentially useful for policy making, because they provide guidance on the type of information to target in order to stimulate or limit cooperation.

Keywords: Information; Cooperation; Repeated game; Metastudy; Laboratory experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D8 H4 L1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (31)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10683-017-9517-4

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