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Third-party manipulation of conflict: an experiment

Piotr Evdokimov () and Umberto Garfagnini
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Piotr Evdokimov: ITAM
Umberto Garfagnini: University of Surrey

Experimental Economics, 2018, vol. 21, issue 1, 27-49

Abstract: Abstract We design a laboratory experiment in which an interested third party endowed with private information sends a public message to two conflicting players, who then make their choices. We find that third-party communication is not strategic. Nevertheless, a hawkish message by a third party makes hawkish behavior more likely while a dovish message makes it less likely. Moreover, how subjects respond to the message is largely unaffected by the third party’s incentives. We argue that our results are consistent with a focal point interpretation in the spirit of Schelling.

Keywords: Third-party communication; Experiment; Conflict game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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