Heterogeneous guilt sensitivities and incentive effects
Charles Bellemare (),
Alexander Sebald () and
Additional contact information
Charles Bellemare: Université Laval, CRREP
Experimental Economics, 2018, vol. 21, issue 2, 316-336
Abstract Psychological games of guilt aversion assume that preferences depend on (beliefs about) beliefs and on the guilt sensitivity of the decision-maker. We present an experiment designed to measure guilt sensitivities at the individual level for various stake sizes. We use the data to estimate a structural choice model that allows for heterogeneity, and permits that guilt sensitivities depend on stake size. We find substantial heterogeneity of guilt sensitivities in our population, with 60% of decision makers displaying stake-dependent guilt sensitivity. For these decision makers, we find that average guilt sensitivities are significantly different from zero for all stakes considered, while significantly decreasing with the level of stakes.
Keywords: Guilt sensitivity; Psychological game theory; Heterogeneity; Stakes; Dictator game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A13 C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10683-017-9543-2 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
Working Paper: Heterogeneous guilt sensitivities and incentive effects (2017)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:expeco:v:21:y:2018:i:2:d:10.1007_s10683-017-9543-2
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ry/journal/10683/PS2
Access Statistics for this article
Experimental Economics is currently edited by David J. Cooper, Lata Gangadharan and Charles N. Noussair
More articles in Experimental Economics from Springer, Economic Science Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla ().