A minimum effort coordination game experiment in continuous time

Ailin Leng (), Lana Friesen, Kenan Kalayci and Priscilla Man
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Ailin Leng: University of Queensland

Experimental Economics, 2018, vol. 21, issue 3, No 5, 549-572

Abstract: Abstract We conduct an experiment on a minimum effort coordination game in a (quasi-)continuous time-frame, where effort choices can be switched freely during a 60-s period. The cooperation levels of the continuous time treatments are not significantly different from the discrete time treatments. Providing subjects with the information on the effort choices of all group members increases the average effort level in continuous time only. The minimum effort level in continuous time with full information feedback is also substantially higher than that with limited information feedback, but the difference is statistically insignificant. With limited information feedback, subjects rarely coordinate to increase their efforts simultaneously to change the group minimum within a period. Our findings imply that continuous time games are not behaviorally equivalent to infinitely repeated discrete time games.

Keywords: Continuous time; Minimum effort game; Coordination game; Information; Laboratory experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10683-017-9550-3

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