Strategy revision opportunities and collusion

Matthew Embrey, Friederike Mengel and Ronald Peeters

Experimental Economics, 2019, vol. 22, issue 4, No 4, 834-856

Abstract: Abstract This paper studies whether and how strategy revision opportunities affect levels of collusion in indefinitely repeated two-player games. Consistent with standard theory, we find that such opportunities do not affect strategy choices, or collusion levels, if the game is of strategic substitutes. In games of strategic complements, by contrast, revision opportunities lead to more collusion. We discuss alternative explanations for this result.

Keywords: Strategy revision opportunities; Cooperation; Repeated games; Complements versus substitutes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 C92 D43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Working Paper: Strategy Revision Opportunities and Collusion (2016)
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DOI: 10.1007/s10683-018-9580-5

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