Best practices in replication: a case study of common information in coordination games

Roy Chen, Yan Chen () and Yohanes Riyanto
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Roy Chen: National University of Singapore
Yan Chen: University of Michigan

Experimental Economics, 2021, vol. 24, issue 1, No 2, 2-30

Abstract: Abstract Recently, social science research replicability has received close examination, with discussions revolving around the degree of success in replicating experimental results. We lend insight to the replication discussion by examining the quality of replication studies. We examine how even a seemingly minor protocol deviation in the experimental process (Camerer et al. in Science 351(6280):143–1436, 2016. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aaf0918 ), the removal of common information, can lead to a finding of “non-replication” of the results from the original study (Chen and Chen in Am Econ Rev 101(6):2562–2589, 2011). Our analysis of the data from the original study, its replication, and a series of new experiments shows that, with common information, we obtain the original result in Chen and Chen (2011), whereas without common information, we obtain the null result in Camerer et al. (2016). Together, we use our findings to propose a set of procedure recommendations to increase the quality of replications of laboratory experiments in the social sciences.

Keywords: Replication; Common information; Coordination games; Group identity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C91 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10683-020-09658-8

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