Inequality, role reversal and cooperation in multiple group membership settings

Andreas Lange (), Jan Schmitz and Claudia Schwirplies ()
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Andreas Lange: University of Hamburg
Claudia Schwirplies: University of Hamburg

Experimental Economics, 2022, vol. 25, issue 1, No 3, 68-110

Abstract: Abstract We investigate the role of endowment inequality in a local and global public goods setting with multiple group membership and examine the effect of temporal role reversal on cooperation decisions. Subjects can contribute to a global public good which benefits all subjects and two local public goods which benefit only subjects of either their own group or the group of the other endowment type. Endowment inequality per-se decreases contributions of subjects with a high endowment to the global public good, but increases cooperation of subjects with a low endowment on their local public good, thereby aggravating income disparities. Exogenously induced role reversal for several periods affects cooperation behavior of subjects with a high endowment positively and induces them to contribute more to the global good. Cooperation in unequal environments thus appears to be more stable when all parties have experienced the public goods game from the disadvantageous perspective.

Keywords: Voluntary contributions; Multiple public goods; Cooperation; Inequality; Role reversal; Perspective change; Lab experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 C92 D62 D63 D64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10683-021-09705-y

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