EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Voluntary redistribution mechanism in asymmetric coordination games

Masaki Aoyagi, Naoko Nishimura () and Yoshitaka Okano ()
Additional contact information
Naoko Nishimura: Ritsumeikan University
Yoshitaka Okano: Kansai University

Experimental Economics, 2022, vol. 25, issue 2, No 3, 444-482

Abstract: Abstract An inequality game is an asymmetric 2 × 2 coordination game in which player 1 earns a substantially higher payoff than player 2 except in the inefficient Nash equilibrium (NE). The two players may have either common or conflicting interests over the two NE. This paper studies a redistribution scheme which allows the players to voluntarily transfer their payoffs after the play of an inequality game. We find that the redistribution scheme induces positive transfer from player 1 to player 2 in both common- and conflicting- interest games, and is particularly effective in increasing efficient coordination and reducing coordination failures in conflicting-interest games. We explain these findings by considering reciprocity by player 1 in response to the sacrifice made by player 2 in achieving efficient coordination in conflicting-interest games.

Keywords: Equity; Efficiency; Transfer; Reciprocity; Sacrifice; C72; D31; D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10683-021-09719-6 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:expeco:v:25:y:2022:i:2:d:10.1007_s10683-021-09719-6

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ry/journal/10683/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s10683-021-09719-6

Access Statistics for this article

Experimental Economics is currently edited by David J. Cooper, Lata Gangadharan and Charles N. Noussair

More articles in Experimental Economics from Springer, Economic Science Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().

 
Page updated 2022-08-19
Handle: RePEc:kap:expeco:v:25:y:2022:i:2:d:10.1007_s10683-021-09719-6