Beliefs and (in)stability in normal-form games

Kyle Hyndman, Antoine Terracol and Jonathan Vaksmann ()
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Jonathan Vaksmann: Le Mans Université

Experimental Economics, 2022, vol. 25, issue 4, No 3, 1146-1172

Abstract: Abstract In this paper, we use experimental data to study players’ stability in normal-form games where subjects have to report beliefs and choose actions. Subjects saw each of 12 games four times in a regular or isomorphic form spread over two days without feedback. We document a high degree of stability within the same (strategically equivalent) game, although time and changes in the presentation of the game do lead to less stability. To look at stability across different games, we adopt the level-k theory, and show that stability of both beliefs and actions is significantly lower. Finally, we estimate a structural model in which players either apply a consistent level of reasoning across strategically different games, or reasoning levels change from game to game. Our results show that approximately 23% of subjects apply a consistent level of reasoning across the 12 games, but that they assign a low level of sophistication to their opponent. The remaining 77% apply different levels of reasoning to different games. We show that this may be due to subjects being attracted to the action with the highest possible payoff.

Keywords: Game theory; Beliefs; Stability; Level-k thinking; Experiment; C72; C91; D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Related works:
Working Paper: Beliefs and (in)stability in normal-form games (2022)
Working Paper: Beliefs and (In)Stability in Normal-Form Games (2013)
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DOI: 10.1007/s10683-022-09747-w

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