Gender differences in alternating-offer bargaining: an experimental study

Iñigo Hernandez-Arenaz () and Nagore Iriberri ()
Additional contact information
Iñigo Hernandez-Arenaz: Universidad Pública de Navarra & INARBE
Nagore Iriberri: University of the Basque Country, UPV/EHU and IKERBASQUE, Basque Foundation for Science

Experimental Economics, 2023, vol. 26, issue 4, No 6, 879-914

Abstract: Abstract A laboratory study was carried out to analyze the relationship between ambiguity regarding the sharing norms in structured alternating-offer bargaining and gender differences in bargaining. Symmetric environments, where a 50:50 split emerges as the unique sensible norm, showed the lowest ambiguity and gender differences are absent. We increased ambiguity by introducing asymmetries into the bargaining environment by making one bargaining party get a higher share than the other (due to empowerment, entitlement or informational asymmetries), but without imposing new sharing norms. In these situations, men are less likely to reach an agreement, but, when they do, they obtain a larger share of the pie. As a result, men and women show similar overall earnings but earnings are lower when bargaining with men. We find suggestive evidence that gender differences diminish when we reduce ambiguity regarding the sharing norms by providing information about other participants’ agreements in asymmetric environments.

Keywords: J16; D91; C75; Bargaining; Gender differences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10683-023-09796-9 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:expeco:v:26:y:2023:i:4:d:10.1007_s10683-023-09796-9

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ry/journal/10683/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s10683-023-09796-9

Access Statistics for this article

Experimental Economics is currently edited by David J. Cooper, Lata Gangadharan and Charles N. Noussair

More articles in Experimental Economics from Springer, Economic Science Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().