Participatory incentives

Francesco Bripi and Daniela Grieco

Experimental Economics, 2023, vol. 26, issue 4, No 4, 813-849

Abstract: Abstract We design a lab-in-the-field experiment involving naturally occurring groups operating in three South-African townships. We introduce an incentives-based mechanism named “participatory incentives” consisting of monetary incentives that are awarded conditional on the group reaching a threshold of minimum level of joint contribution to a common project or good. We show that participatory incentives significantly raise average contribution levels (from 29 to 62% of the endowment) and are even more effective in the presence of highly deprived people. We complement the reduced form estimations of the experimental data with a structural model that sheds light on the role of subjects’ beliefs and responsiveness to a social norm of high cooperation.

Keywords: Artefactual field experiment; Cooperation; Incentives; Structural estimation; Social norm (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D63 D71 H41 O12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.1007/s10683-023-09798-7

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