Social status and prosocial behavior

Jin Zheng (), Arthur Schram and Tianle Song ()
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Jin Zheng: Huazhong University of Science and Technology
Tianle Song: Zhongnan University of Economics and Law

Experimental Economics, 2023, vol. 26, issue 5, No 4, 1085-1114

Abstract: Abstract This paper studies the effects of social status—a socially recognized ranking of individuals—on prosocial behavior. We use a laboratory experiment and propose a theory to address this issue. In a one-shot game, two players, whose social status is either earned or randomly assigned, jointly make effort contributions to a project. Player 1 first suggests an effort level for each player to player 2 who then determines the actual effort levels. Deviation from the proposal is costly. We find causal evidence that high-status players are less selfish than their low-status counterparts. In particular, high-status players 2 provide relatively more effort, ceteris paribus, than those with low status. The experimental results and theoretical framework suggest that a high social ranking yields more social behavior and that this can be attributed to the sense of responsibility that it gives.

Keywords: Randomly generated status; Earned status; Prosocial; Laboratory experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A14 C91 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.1007/s10683-023-09810-0

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