On the relevance of irrelevant strategies

Ayala Arad (), Benjamin Bachi () and Amnon Maltz
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Ayala Arad: Tel Aviv University
Benjamin Bachi: University of Haifa

Experimental Economics, 2023, vol. 26, issue 5, No 6, 1142-1184

Abstract: Abstract The experimental literature on individual choice has repeatedly documented how seemingly-irrelevant options systematically shift decision-makers’ choices. However, little is known about such effects in strategic interactions. We experimentally examine whether adding seemingly-irrelevant strategies, such as a dominated strategy or a duplicate of an existing strategy, affects players’ behavior in simultaneous games. In coordination games, we find that adding a dominated strategy increases the likelihood that players choose the strategy which dominates it, and duplicating a strategy increases its choice share; The players’ opponents seem to internalize this behavior and best respond to it. In single-equilibrium games, these effects disappear. Consequently, we suggest that irrelevant strategies affect behavior only when they serve a strategic purpose. We discuss different theoretical approaches that accommodate the effect of salience and may explain our findings.

Keywords: Coordination; Dominated strategy; Salience; Level-k; Asymmetric dominance effect; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.1007/s10683-023-09814-w

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