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Fairness has less impact when agents are less informed

Jennie Huang (), Judd B. Kessler () and Muriel Niederle ()
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Jennie Huang: The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania
Judd B. Kessler: University of Pennsylvania
Muriel Niederle: Stanford University

Experimental Economics, 2024, vol. 27, issue 1, No 8, 155-174

Abstract: Abstract Research from the last four decades suggests that fairness plays an important role in economic transactions. However, the vast majority of this research investigates behavior in an environment where agents are fully informed. We develop a new experimental paradigm—nesting the widely used ultimatum game—and find that fairness has less impact on outcomes when agents are less informed. As we remove information, offers become less generous and unfair offers are more likely to be accepted.

Keywords: Fairness; Ultimatum game; Information; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10683-023-09795-w

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