Does goal revision undermine self-regulation through goals? An experiment

Jonas Pilgaard Kaiser (), Alexander K. Koch () and Julia Nafziger
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Jonas Pilgaard Kaiser: Aarhus University
Alexander K. Koch: Aarhus University

Experimental Economics, 2024, vol. 27, issue 3, No 4, 604-636

Abstract: Abstract We offer a novel test of whether non-binding goals set ahead of a task are effective motivators, taking into account that individuals in principle could easily revise these goals. In our setting, subjects either set a goal some days prior to an online task (early goal) or right at the start of the task (late goal). Two further treatments allow for (unanticipated) explicit revision of the early goal. We observe that (i) early goals are larger than late goals; (ii) subjects who set early goals work more than those who only set a late goal if they explicitly revise their goal and are reminded about their revised goal. A secondary contribution of our paper is that our design addresses a treatment migration problem present in earlier studies on goals that stems from the fact that subjects in a ‘no goals’ control condition may privately set goals.

Keywords: Self-control; Present-biased preferences; Goals; Goal revision; Commitment devices; Real effort; Online experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D01 D90 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1007/s10683-024-09826-0

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