One bad apple spoils the barrel? Public good provision under threshold uncertainty

Fredrik Carlsson, Claes Ek () and Andreas Lange ()
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Claes Ek: University of Gothenburg
Andreas Lange: University of Hamburg

Experimental Economics, 2024, vol. 27, issue 3, No 6, 664-686

Abstract: Abstract We report laboratory evidence on the voluntary provision of threshold public goods when the exact location of the threshold is not known. Our experimental treatments explicitly compare two prominent technologies, summation, and weakest link. Uncertainty in threshold location is particularly detrimental to threshold attainment under weakest link, where low contributions by one subject cannot be compensated by others. In contrast, threshold uncertainty does not affect contributions under summation. We demonstrate that non-binding pledges improve the chances of threshold attainment under both technologies, particularly under weakest link.

Keywords: Public goods; Threshold uncertainty; Weakest link; Coordination; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 H41 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1007/s10683-024-09836-y

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