Is it what you say or how you say it?

Xiangdong Qin, Siyu Wang () and Mike Zhiren Wu
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Xiangdong Qin: Shanghai Jiao Tong University
Siyu Wang: Wichita State University
Mike Zhiren Wu: Monash University

Experimental Economics, 2024, vol. 27, issue 4, No 8, 874-921

Abstract: Abstract This study investigates the mechanisms driving the effectiveness of free-form communication in promoting cooperation within a sequential social dilemma game. We hypothesize that the self-constructing nature of free-form communication enhances the sincerity of messages and increases the disutility of dishonoring promises. Our experimental results demonstrate that free-form messages outperform both restricted promises and treatments where subjects select and use previously constructed free-form messages. Interestingly, we find that selected free-form messages and restricted promises achieve similar levels of cooperation. We observe that free-form messages with higher sincerity increase the likelihood of high-price and high-quality choices, thereby promoting cooperation. These messages frequently include promises and honesty, while threats do not promote cooperation. Our findings emphasize the crucial role of the self-constructed nature of free-form messages in promoting cooperation, exceeding the impact of message content compared to restricted communication protocols.

Keywords: Communication; Promise; Threat; Cooperation; Commitment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D83 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1007/s10683-024-09830-4

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