EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Explaining interference effects in prisoner dilemma games

Jerome Busemeyer (), Masanari Asano () and Meijuan Lu ()
Additional contact information
Jerome Busemeyer: Indiana University
Masanari Asano: Kindai University
Meijuan Lu: Indiana University

Experimental Economics, 2024, vol. 27, issue 4, No 3, 743-765

Abstract: Abstract This article presents a new approach to understanding strategic decision making inspired by the mathematics of quantum theory. Empirical support for this new approach is based on five different puzzling findings from past work on the prisoner dilemma game including the disjunction effect, the interference of predictions on actions in simultaneous and sequential games, question order effect, and the effects of cheap promises. Eight different quantum models are described, which purport to account for these puzzling findings. The competing models are systematically compared with respect to their capability of accounting for the five empirical findings.

Keywords: Prisoner dilemma; Disjunction effect; Interference effect; Question order effect; Quantum cognition; C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10683-024-09838-w Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:expeco:v:27:y:2024:i:4:d:10.1007_s10683-024-09838-w

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ry/journal/10683/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s10683-024-09838-w

Access Statistics for this article

Experimental Economics is currently edited by David J. Cooper, Lata Gangadharan and Charles N. Noussair

More articles in Experimental Economics from Springer, Economic Science Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:kap:expeco:v:27:y:2024:i:4:d:10.1007_s10683-024-09838-w