Does disappointment aversion explain non-truthful reporting in strategy-proof mechanisms?

Roy Chen (), Peter Katuščák (), Thomas Kittsteiner () and Katharina Kütter ()
Additional contact information
Roy Chen: RWTH Aachen University
Peter Katuščák: RWTH Aachen University
Thomas Kittsteiner: RWTH Aachen University
Katharina Kütter: RWTH Aachen University

Experimental Economics, 2024, vol. 27, issue 5, No 8, 1184-1210

Abstract: Abstract Disappointment aversion has been suggested as an explanation for non-truthful rankings in strategy-proof school-choice matching mechanisms. We test this hypothesis using a novel experimental design that eliminates important alternative causes of non-truthful rankings. The design uses a simple contingent choice task with only two possible outcomes. Between two treatments, we manipulate the possibility for disappointment aversion to have an effect on ranking. We find a small and statistically marginally significant treatment effect in the direction predicted by disappointment aversion. We therefore conclude that disappointment aversion is a minor contributor to non-truthful rankings in strategy-proof school-choice matching mechanisms.

Keywords: Matching; Loss aversion; Strategy-proofness; Experiment; School choice; Market design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 D47 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10683-024-09847-9 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:expeco:v:27:y:2024:i:5:d:10.1007_s10683-024-09847-9

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ry/journal/10683/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s10683-024-09847-9

Access Statistics for this article

Experimental Economics is currently edited by David J. Cooper, Lata Gangadharan and Charles N. Noussair

More articles in Experimental Economics from Springer, Economic Science Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().