What Does it Take to Eliminate the use of a Strategy Strictly Dominated by a Mixture?

John van Huyck, Frederick Rankin and Raymond Battalio

Experimental Economics, 1999, vol. 2, issue 2, 129-150

Abstract: This paper reports an experiment to determine whether subjects will learn to stop using a strictly dominated strategy that can be an above average reply. It is difficult to find an experimental design that eliminates the play of the strictly dominated strategy completely. The least effective treatment used money to motivate behavior directly. The most effective treatment used a binary-lottery with money prizes to induce preferences, but even this treatment required giving subjects plenty of experience. Doing so reduced the play of the strictly dominated strategy to around 10 percent by the end of a session. There is no evidence for the explosive cycling needed to make the strictly dominated strategy an above average reply. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1999

Keywords: game theory; mixed strategies; dominance; induced value theory; risk aversion; binary lotteries; uncertainty aversion; spite; human behavior (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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DOI: 10.1023/A:1009996122528

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