Volunteers and Pseudo-Volunteers: The Effect of Recruitment Method in Dictator Experiments

Catherine Eckel and Philip Grossman

Experimental Economics, 2000, vol. 3, issue 2, 107-120

Abstract: We report the results of experiments that test for behavioral differences between volunteer subjects recruited in the usual way and pseudo-volunteer subjects in experiments conducted during class time. In a series of dictator games, we find that psuedo-volunteers are more generous on average than their volunteer counterparts, and that non-monetary factors such as religious or altruistic preferences have a greater effect on the giving behavior of pseudo-volunteers. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2000

Keywords: experimental methodology; dictator game; charitable giving (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (74)

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DOI: 10.1023/A:1026572918109

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