The False Consensus Effect Disappears if Representative Information and Monetary Incentives Are Given

Dirk Engelmann and Martin Strobel

Experimental Economics, 2000, vol. 3, issue 3, 260 pages

Abstract: We present an experiment on the false consensus effect. Unlike previous experiments, we provide monetary incentives for revealing the actual estimation of others' behavior. In each session and round, sixteen subjects make a choice between two options simultaneously. Then they estimate the choices of a randomly selected subgroup. For half of the rounds we provide information about other subjects' choices. There we find no false consensus effect. At an aggregate level, subjects significantly underweight rather than overweight their choices. When we do not provide information, the presence of a false consensus effect cannot be detected. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2000

Keywords: false consensor; experimental economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (108)

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Working Paper: The false consensus effect disappears if representative information and monetary incentives are given (1999)
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DOI: 10.1023/A:1011472501737

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