A Common Pool Resource Game with Sequential Decisions and Experimental Evidence

Lluis Bru, Susana Cabrera, C. Monica Capra and Rosario Gomez

Experimental Economics, 2003, vol. 6, issue 1, 114 pages

Abstract: We describe a common pool resource game in which players choose how much of the stock to extract in a sequential manner. There are two choices and one represents taking a larger proportion of the stock than the other. After a player makes a choice, the remaining stock grows at a constant rate. We consider a game with a finite number of alternating moves. It is shown that changes in the larger proportion of the stock that the players are allowed to take and the growth rate affect equilibrium, but have little effect on behavior in the laboratory. In addition to observing more cooperation than predicted, we observe that parameters that are strategically irrelevant affect behavior. The results of this research might help policy makers in developing adequate policies to prevent overexploitation of some natural renewable resources. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2003

Keywords: laboratory experiments; common pool resources; games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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DOI: 10.1023/A:1024209010570

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