Reinforcement and Directional Learning in the Ultimatum Game with Responder Competition

Brit Grosskopf

Experimental Economics, 2003, vol. 6, issue 2, 158 pages

Abstract: Demands in the Ultimatum Game in its traditional form with one proposer and one responder are compared with demands in an Ultimatum Game with responder competition. In this modified form one proposer faces three responders who can accept or reject the split of the pie. Initial demands in both ultimatum games are quite similar, however in the course of the experiment, demands in the ultimatum game with responder competition are significantly higher than in the traditional case with repeated random matching. Individual round-to-round changes of choices that are consistent with directional learning are the driving forces behind the differences between the two learning curves and cannot be tracked by an adjustment process in response to accumulated reinforcements. The importance of combining reinforcement and directional learning is addressed. Moreover, learning transfer between the two ultimatum games is analyzed. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2003

Keywords: ultimatum game; competition; reinforcement learning; directional learning; learning transfer (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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DOI: 10.1023/A:1025305020751

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