Heterogeneous Agents in Public Goods Experiments

Roberto Burlando () and Francesco Guala

Experimental Economics, 2005, vol. 8, issue 1, 35-54

Abstract: We explore by purely experimental means a heterogeneous agents scenario in experimental public goods games, assuming the existence of at least three types of player: free riders, cooperators, and reciprocators. We identify the various types by means of four classification methods, and then play the public goods game with homogeneous groups. We observe that (eq1) the average contribution level is enhanced in this setting; (2) the decay phenomenon is replicated in groups of ‘pure’ free riders, whereas in groups of cooperative and reciprocating players the contribution is high and fairly stable throughout the game. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005

Keywords: economic experiment; voluntary contribution; heterogeneous agents; reciprocation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (182)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10683-005-0436-4

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