On the Design of Peer Punishment Experiments

Marco Casari

Experimental Economics, 2005, vol. 8, issue 2, 107-115

Abstract: Some peer punishment technologies may bias experimental results in unwanted ways. A critical parameter to consider in the design is the “fine-to-fee” ratio, which measures the income reduction for the targeted subject relative to the cost for the subject who requested the punishment. We show that a punishment technology commonly used in experiments embeds a variable fine-to-fee ratio and show that it could confound the empirical findings about why, whom, and how much subjects punish. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005

Keywords: sanctions; public goods; common-pool resources; cooperation; experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (37)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10683-005-0869-9

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