Subsidy Schemes and Charitable Contributions: A Closer Look

Douglas Davis, Edward Millner () and Robert Reilly

Experimental Economics, 2005, vol. 8, issue 2, 85-106

Abstract: This article replicates and “stress tests” a recent finding by Eckel and Grossman (2003) that matching subsidies generate substantially higher Charity Receipts than theoretically comparable rebate subsidies. In a first replication treatment, we show that most choices are consist with a “constant (gross) contribution” rule, suggesting that inattention to the subsidies’ differing net consequences may explain the higher revenues elicited with matching subsidies. Results of additional treatments suggest that (a) the charity dimension of the decision problems has little to do with the result, and (b) extra information regarding the net consequences of decisions reduces but does not eliminate the result. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005

Keywords: charitable giving; experiment; subsidies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (54)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10683-005-0867-y

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