Exploring group decision making in a power-to-take experiment

Ronald Bosman (), Heike Hennig-Schmidt and Frans van Winden ()

Experimental Economics, 2006, vol. 9, issue 1, 35-51

Abstract: Most studies that compare individual and group behavior neglect the in-group decision making process. This paper explores the decision making process within groups in a strategic setting: a two player power-to-take experiment. Discussions preceding group decisions are video taped and analyzed. We find the following: (1) no impact of the group setting as such on individual behavior; (2) heterogeneity of individual types; (3) perceptions of fairness are hardly discussed and are prone to the self-serving bias; (4) groups ignore the decision rule of other groups and typically view them as if they were single agents. (5) We also show that to explain group outcomes two factors have to be taken into account that are often neglected: the distribution of individual types over groups and the decision rules that groups use to arrive at their decision. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2006

Keywords: Groups; Decision rule; Fairness; Experiment; Video (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (58)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10683-006-4310-9

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