Internet cautions: Experimental games with internet partners

Catherine Eckel and Rick Wilson ()

Experimental Economics, 2006, vol. 9, issue 1, 53-66

Abstract: We report the results of experiments conducted over the internet between two different laboratories. Each subject at one site is matched with a subject at another site in a trust game experiment. We investigate whether subjects believe they are really matched with another person, and suggest a methodology for ensuring that subjects’ beliefs are accurate. Results show that skepticism can lead to misleading results. If subjects do not believe they are matched with a real person, they trust too much: i.e., they trust the experimenter rather than their partner. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2006

Keywords: Methodology; Experiment; Trust game; Beliefs; Internet (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (28)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10683-006-4307-4

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