A race beyond the bottom: the nature of bidding for a firm

Taiji Furusawa, Kazumi Hori () and Ian Wooton ()

International Tax and Public Finance, 2015, vol. 22, issue 3, 452-475

Abstract: We examine how the bidding environment may affect the outcome of tax competition between two countries (or two regions) in attracting a firm’s foreign direct investment (FDI). We compare the equilibrium location choice and payoffs from an English auction, with both complete and incomplete information, relative to those in the traditional setting of a sealed-bid first-price auction. We find that an English auction leads to more aggressive bidding in “race beyond the bottom,” where the nations may bid beyond their own valuations of the FDI. We also discuss the roles of auction protocol and information asymmetry on the auction outcome. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

Keywords: Tax competition; Foreign direct investment; International ownership; English auction; Information asymmetry; F12; F23; H25; H73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Working Paper: A Race beyond the Bottom: The Nature of Bidding for a Firm (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:22:y:2015:i:3:p:452-475

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DOI: 10.1007/s10797-014-9326-z

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