A Race beyond the Bottom: The Nature of Bidding for a Firm
Taiji Furusawa (),
Kazumi Hori and
Ian Wooton ()
No 3049, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo
We examine how the bidding environment may affect the outcome of tax competition between two countries (or two regions) in attracting a firm’s foreign direct investment (FDI).We compare the equilibrium location choice and payoffs from an English auction, with both complete and incomplete information, relative to those in the traditional setting of a sealed-bid first-price auction. We find that an English auction leads to more aggressive bidding in “race beyond the bottom,” where the nations may bid beyond their own valuations of the FDI. We also discuss the roles of auction protocol and information asymmetry on the auction outcome.
Keywords: tax competition; foreign direct investment; international ownership; English auction; information asymmetry (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F12 F23 H25 H73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: A race beyond the bottom: the nature of bidding for a firm (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3049
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