Signaling, network externalities, and subsidies

Bruno De Borger and Amihai Glazer

International Tax and Public Finance, 2016, vol. 23, issue 5, No 2, 798-811

Abstract: Abstract A signal may be more effective the greater the number of people who use the same signal, thereby creating a network externality and potentially generating multiple equilibria. A subsidy to the signal can increase efficiency, and the signalers may benefit from the subsidy even if they pay taxes to finance it. But people who benefit from the signal may oppose too large a subsidy, because a large subsidy could destroy the signaling value.

Keywords: Signaling; Network externalities; Subsidies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 D82 J32 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10797-015-9384-x Abstract (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:23:y:2016:i:5:d:10.1007_s10797-015-9384-x

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ce/journal/10797/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s10797-015-9384-x

Access Statistics for this article

International Tax and Public Finance is currently edited by Ronald B. Davies and Kimberly Scharf

More articles in International Tax and Public Finance from Springer, International Institute of Public Finance Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().