Information, belief elicitation and threshold effects in the 5X1000 tax scheme: a framed field experiment

Leonardo Becchetti, Vittorio Pelligra and Tommaso Reggiani ()

International Tax and Public Finance, 2017, vol. 24, issue 6, No 4, 1026-1049

Abstract: Abstract In this paper, we study by means of a framed field experiment on a representative sample of the population the effect on people’s charitable giving of three, substantial and procedural, elements: information provision, belief elicitation and threshold on distribution. We frame this investigation within the 5X1000 tax scheme, a mechanism through which Italian taxpayers may choose to give a small proportion (0.5%) of their income tax to a voluntary organization to fund its activities. We find two main results: (i) providing information or eliciting beliefs about previous donations increases the likelihood of a donation, while thresholds have no effect; (ii) information about previous funding increases donations to organizations that received fewer donations in the past, while belief elicitation also increases donations to organizations that received most donations in the past, since individuals are more likely to donate to the organizations they rank first.

Keywords: Charitable giving; Framed field experiment; Social information effect; Inequity aversion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D64 H00 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Working Paper: Information, belief elicitation and threshold effects in the 5X1000 tax scheme: a framed field experiment (2017)
Working Paper: Information, Belief Elicitation and Threshold Effects in the 5X1000 Tax Scheme: A Framed Field Experiment (2017)
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DOI: 10.1007/s10797-017-9474-z

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