Information, Belief Elicitation and Threshold Effects in the 5X1000 Tax Scheme: A Framed Field Experiment
Leonardo Becchetti,
Vittorio Pelligra () and
Tommaso Reggiani ()
Additional contact information
Vittorio Pelligra: University of Cagliari
No 10710, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
Abstract:
In this paper we study by means of a framed field experiment on a representative sample of the population the effect on people's charitable giving of three, substantial and procedural, elements: information provision, belief elicitation and threshold on distribution. We frame this investigation within the 5X1000 tax scheme, a mechanism through which Italian taxpayers may choose to give a small proportion (0.5%) of their income tax to a voluntary organization to fund its activities. We find two main results: a social information effect, since information on total donations received by the organizations in the previous year significantly increases the share of donors, and a distributional effect, leading, the information provision, to a significant increase in the share of donors to the organization reporting the lowest aggregate donations.
Keywords: social information effect; 5X1000; framed field experiment; charitable-giving (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D64 H00 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 45 pages
Date: 2017-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)
Published - revised version published in: International Tax and Public Finance, 2017, 24 (6), 1026-1049
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Journal Article: Information, belief elicitation and threshold effects in the 5X1000 tax scheme: a framed field experiment (2017) 
Working Paper: Information, belief elicitation and threshold effects in the 5X1000 tax scheme: a framed field experiment (2017) 
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