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Benefits to the majority from universal service

Amihai Glazer () and Stef Proost
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Amihai Glazer: University of California, Irvine

International Tax and Public Finance, 2020, vol. 27, issue 2, No 6, 408 pages

Abstract: Abstract Rent seekers may attempt to limit costly rent seeking. One way is to increase the number of projects, even to universal service. In particular, a legislator may propose a number of projects that exceeds the number of members in the majority (as by too many bus stops, or too many university campuses), thereby inducing each member of the majority to reduce his rent-seeking efforts. This mechanism can also induce the majority to favor low quality of the projects, and to favor having the central government impose co-funding requirements on local governments.

Keywords: Rent seeking; Federalism; Universal service; Public agencies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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DOI: 10.1007/s10797-019-09560-x

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