Public goods with high-powered punishment: high cooperation and low efficiency

Terence Burnham

Journal of Bioeconomics, 2015, vol. 17, issue 2, 173-187

Abstract: A laboratory experiment where human subjects play a repeated public goods game with high-powered punishment technology (50:1). Results on three attributes are similar to lower-powered punishment settings (e.g., 3:1): Subjects contribute almost 100 % to the public good, punishment rates are low (under 10 % of maximum), and punishment is directed more toward low contributors. In contrast to lower-powered punishment settings, however, subjects earn less money than they would have in the same setting without punishment. These results contribute to the debate about the origins and maintenance of cooperation. Copyright The Author(s) 2015

Keywords: Cooperation; Reciprocity; Punishment; Public-goods; Altruism; A13; C72; C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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DOI: 10.1007/s10818-014-9191-y

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