How the Design of CEO Equity-Based Compensation can Lead to Lower Audit Fees: Evidence from Australia

Xin Qu, Daifei Yao () and Majella Percy
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Xin Qu: Griffith University
Daifei Yao: Queensland University of Technology
Majella Percy: Griffith University

Journal of Business Ethics, 2020, vol. 163, issue 2, No 7, 308 pages

Abstract: Abstract This paper investigates how the features of CEO equity-based compensation are associated with the agency costs of monitoring (measured by external audit fees) in an Australia setting. We find that audit fees significantly increase when firms award large equity grants to CEOs, which is consistent with the notion that auditors perceive higher risk associated with large equity incentives. However, by empirically testing auditors’ responses to the adoption of performance-vesting provisions, we document evidence that it is the use of accounting-based hurdles that potentially encourages unethical reporting issues. We report that audit fees are negatively associated with the use of market-based hurdles, while accounting-based hurdles lead to significantly higher audit fees but combination hurdles lower audit fees. To reduce the possible undesirable properties of accounting-based hurdles, firms adopt longer vesting periods to provide more balanced future-oriented incentives. Practical implications include the remuneration committee being aware of the hidden costs of poorly designed CEO compensation packages and avoiding undesirable ethical implications, particularly, where the CEO has significant power over the corporation.

Keywords: Equity-based compensation; Audit fees; Agency theory; CEO incentives; Vesting hurdles (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10551-018-4031-y

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