Arts and craftiness: an economic analysis of art heists
Frederick Chen () and
Rebecca Regan
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Frederick Chen: Wake Forest University
Rebecca Regan: Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
Journal of Cultural Economics, 2017, vol. 41, issue 3, No 5, 283-307
Abstract:
Abstract We study the incentives that museums face in determining how much resources to invest in the protection of their artwork from theft. We present and analyze a game-theoretic model of art heists that accounts for the strategic interactions between museums’ and art thieves’ decisions and that incorporates several key features of the black market for stolen art. We find that the equilibrium level of security museums choose need not be monotonic in the true market value or the black market value of artwork, i.e., increasing the value of an art piece—whether it is the true market value or the black market value—does not necessarily lead museums to invest more in protecting their artwork. The effects of parameter changes in the model that reflect a shift of public policy depend critically on what type of policy change is considered. For instance, an increase in the penalty imposed for committing art theft cannot raise the amount of theft in equilibrium and could in fact lead museums to increase their level of security. On the other hand, investing more resources on law enforcement agencies so that they are better able to solve art crimes can actually increase the amount of theft in equilibrium by causing museums to spend less on security.
Keywords: Art heists; Museums; Art thieves; Black market (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Z11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:jculte:v:41:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s10824-016-9269-6
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DOI: 10.1007/s10824-016-9269-6
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