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Mixed duopoly, cross-ownership and partial privatization

Ritika Jain and Rupayan Pal

Journal of Economics, 2012, vol. 107, issue 1, 45-70

Abstract: This paper investigates the effects of cross-ownership on optimal privatization, and vice-versa, in mixed duopoly. It shows that cross-ownership is profitable to the private firm only if the level of privatization of the public firm is sufficiently high. In equilibrium, cross-ownership does not take place even if there is partial privatization. However, the possibility of cross-ownership significantly limits the socially optimal level of privatization in most of the situations. Moreover, it demonstrates that full nationalization is socially optimal, in case of sufficiently convex identical cost functions and homogeneous goods. These results have strong implications to both divestment and competition policies. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2012

Keywords: Cross-ownership; Mixed duopoly; Partial privatization; Product differentiation; D43; L13; H42; L32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:107:y:2012:i:1:p:45-70

DOI: 10.1007/s00712-011-0260-6

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