One-sided private provision of public goods with implicit Lindahl pricing

Volker Meier

Journal of Economics, 2013, vol. 110, issue 2, 186 pages

Abstract: We consider a sequential game in which one player produces a public good and the other player can influence this decision by making an unconditional transfer. An efficient allocation requires the Lindahl property: the sum of the two (implicit) individual prices has to be equal to the resource cost of the public good. Under mild conditions this requires a personal price for the providing player that lies below half of the resource cost. These results can, for example, justify high marginal taxes on wages of secondary earners. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2013

Keywords: Lindahl pricing; Noncooperative games; Private provision of public goods; Stackelberg equilibirum; C72; D61; H21; H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00712-012-0292-6 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: One-sided private provision of public goods with implicit Lindahl pricing (2013)
Working Paper: One-Sided Private Provision of Public Goods with Implicit Lindahl Pricing (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:110:y:2013:i:2:p:181-186

DOI: 10.1007/s00712-012-0292-6

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Economics is currently edited by Giacomo Corneo

More articles in Journal of Economics from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().