One-sided private provision of public goods with implicit Lindahl pricing

Volker Meier

Munich Reprints in Economics from University of Munich, Department of Economics

Abstract: We consider a sequential game in which one player produces a public good and the other player can influence this decision by making an unconditional transfer. An efficient allocation requires the Lindahl property: the sum of the two (implicit) individual prices has to be equal to the resource cost of the public good. Under mild conditions this requires a personal price for the providing player that lies below half of the resource cost. These results can, for example, justify high marginal taxes on wages of secondary earners.

Date: 2013
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Published in Journal of Economics / Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie 2 110(2013): pp. 181-186

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Related works:
Journal Article: One-sided private provision of public goods with implicit Lindahl pricing (2013)
Working Paper: One-Sided Private Provision of Public Goods with Implicit Lindahl Pricing (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lmu:muenar:19181

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