Rent-Seeking in Research Markets

Rajeev Goel

The Journal of Technology Transfer, 2003, vol. 28, issue 2, 103-09

Abstract: Using a standard model of uncertain innovation, this paper examines research rivalry and rent-seeking rivalry in innovation markets. Previous literature has not considered the implications of rent-seeking in research markets. We find that greater rent-seeking by the rival unambiguously lowers own profit-maximizing research and rent-seeking activity. On the other hand, greater research spending by the rival also lowers own research and rent-seeking, especially when the probability of own innovation is low. Policy implications are discussed. Copyright 2003 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 2003
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Downloads: (external link)
http://journals.kluweronline.com/issn/0892-9912/contents link to full text (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:jtecht:v:28:y:2003:i:2:p:103-09

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... nt/journal/10961/PS2

Access Statistics for this article

The Journal of Technology Transfer is currently edited by Albert N. Link, Donald S. Siegel, Barry Bozeman and Simon Mosey

More articles in The Journal of Technology Transfer from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().