Cooperation with Externalities and Uncertainty

Helga Habis and Dávid Csercsik

Networks and Spatial Economics, 2015, vol. 15, issue 1, 16 pages

Abstract: We introduce a new solution concept to problems with externalities, which is the first in the literature to take into account economic, regulatory and physical stability aspects of network problems in the very same model. A new class of cooperative games is defined where the worth of a coalition depends on the behavior of other players and on the state of nature as well. We allow for coalitions to form both before and after the resolution of uncertainty, hence agreements must be stable against both types of deviations. The appropriate extension of the classical core concept, the Sustainable Core, is defined for this new setup to test the stability of allocations in such a complex environment. A prominent application, a game of consumers and generators on an electrical energy transmission network is examined in details, where the power in- and outlets of the nodes have to be determined in a way, that if any line instantaneously fails, none of the remaining lines may be overloaded. We show that fulfilling this safety requirement in a mutually acceptable way can be achieved by choosing an element in the Sustainable Core. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

Keywords: partition function form games; uncertainty; core; sustainability; networks; game theory; externalities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Working Paper: Cooperation with Externalities and Uncertainty (2012)
Working Paper: Cooperation with Externalities and Uncertainty (2012)
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DOI: 10.1007/s11067-014-9265-3

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