Cooperation with Externalities and Uncertainty

Helga Habis and Dávid Csercsik

No 1229, CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS from Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies

Abstract: We introduce a new class of cooperative games where the worth of a coalition depends on the behavior of other players and on the state of nature as well. we allow for coalitions to form both before and after the resolution of uncertainty, hence agreements must be stable against both types of deviations. The appropriate extension of the classicakl core concept, the Sustainable Core, is defined for this new setup to test the stability of allocations in such a complex environment. A prominent application, a game of consumers and generators on an electrical energy transmission network is examined in details, where the power in- and outlets of the nodes have to be determined in a way, that if any line instantaneously fails, none of the remaining lines may be overloaded. We show that fulfilling this safety requirement in a mutually acceptable way can be achieved by choosing an element in the Sustainable Core.

Keywords: partition function form games; uncertainty; core; sustainability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C73 D62 L14 L94 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2012-10
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Cooperation with Externalities and Uncertainty (2015)
Working Paper: Cooperation with Externalities and Uncertainty (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:has:discpr:1229

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