From Bagehot to Brussels: A Review of Which Lender of Last Resort for Europe (Charles A. E. Goodhart, ed.)

John Pattison ()

Open Economies Review, 2001, vol. 12, issue 4, 443-455

Abstract: This article reviews Which Lender of Last Resort for Europe (Charles A.E. Goodhart, ed.). This book addresses the role and functioning of a lender of last resort within the institutional structure of the single European market and the European Monetary Union. The matters reviewed include the following. Does the euro raise the level of financial and systemic risk in Europe? Which financial regulatory and supervisory functions require centralization under EMU? What are the institutional, political, and coordination issues? What is the effect of the evolving European institutional structure on moral hazard? Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2001

Keywords: Central Bank institutions; European monetary union; Lender of last resort; regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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DOI: 10.1023/A:1017995219690

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