Inflation Targeting as a Coordination Device

Andrew Hughes Hallett and Nicola Viegi

Open Economies Review, 2002, vol. 13, issue 4, 362 pages

Abstract: The paper analyses inflation targeting when two independent policy authorities (a central bank and a National Government) have divergent preferences for the optimal policy mix. We demonstrate that the main advantage of inflation targeting, as a policy regime, is that it represents a simple proxy for full coordination between policy authorities. Inflation targeting therefore helps because it reduces the conflicts between fiscal and monetary policy, expecially where there are strong “spillovers” between the two policies. These results are then tested, and largely validated, in a simulation framework using a small open economy calibrated model. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2002

Keywords: inflation targeting; policy coordination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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DOI: 10.1023/A:1020661329413

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