Fiscal-monetary Interactions: The Effect of Fiscal Restraint and Public Monitoring on Central Bank Credibility

Andrew Hughes Hallett and Jan Libich

Open Economies Review, 2007, vol. 18, issue 5, 559-576

Keywords: Monetary-fiscal interaction; Reputation; Credibility; Overriding; Monitoring; Central bank independence; Inflation targeting; Transparency; E52; E61; C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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DOI: 10.1007/s11079-007-9017-9

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