Negotiated tariffs in free entry oligopoly under integrated markets

Yasuhito Tanaka

Open Economies Review, 1991, vol. 2, issue 2, 165-181

Abstract: Using the Nash bargaining approach, this paper analyzes the negotiation of tariffs between two countries in free-entry oligopolies under integrated markets. Employing a symmetric model with linear demand and cost functions, the paper shows that for both countries Pareto-efficient negotiated tariffs are larger than the tariffs at the Nash equilibrium of a non-cooperative tariff game (tariff war) in which each country imposes its optimum tariff. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1991

Keywords: negotiated tariffs; free entry oligopoly; integrated markets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1991
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DOI: 10.1007/BF01886898

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